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Abstract: The paper develops the idea of configuration of ownership to distinguish three 
primary political ideologies: (classical) liberalism, conservatism, and leftism. The liberal 
configuration is atomistic in its recognition of owners and ownership claims; it conforms 
closely to Adam Smith’s “commutative justice,” which Smith represented as a sort of 
social grammar. The conservative configuration also strives for a social grammar, but it 
counts among the set of owners certain spirit-lords such as God and Patria. The liberal 
and conservative configurations become isomorphic if and only if the ownership claims 
of the conservative spirit-lords are reduced to nothing. The left configuration ascribes 
fundamental ownership of resources to the people, the state, and sees laws as 
organizational house-rules into which one enters voluntary by choosing to remain within 
the polity; the type of justice that pertains is parallel to Smith’s “distributive justice,” 
which Smith associated with aspirational rules for achieving beauty in composition. The 
scheme illuminates why the left’s conception of liberty consists in civil liberties. The 
formulation of configurations is used to interpret the semantics of the three primary 
ideologies. Meanwhile, it is noted that actually existing parties and movements are 
admixtures of the three primary ideologies. For example, what makes Republicanism 
“conservative” is that it is relatively conservative; it by no means thoroughly or 
consistently rejects the precept of collective ownership by the polity. 
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Man is a meaning seeking animal. Meaning is developed and sustained in beliefs, 
communities, customs, and institutions. It is represented by symbols and identifiers. 
These components work together as a subculture. 
The meaningfulness of a subculture is enhanced by belonging to things that are 
great and permanent. Thus many look to politics and government. Such subcultures are 
often called ideologies. 
I’m a pragmatic libertarian or classical liberal. I’d love to live in a culture in 
which the identity of mere “liberal” worked for me, but in the Anglosphere that culture 
broke down about a hundred years ago. I spend a lot of time in Sweden, and enjoy being 
able to use just “liberal” and “liberalism,” terms regarded with proper opprobrium by 
both Swedish social democrats and social conservatives. Here I will insinuate that culture 
by calling it just “liberalism.” So “liberalism” here does not mean John Dewey, J.K. 
Galbraith, John Rawls, George Lakoff, and Paul Krugman. Rather, liberalism means 
Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, William Graham Sumner, Friedrich 
Hayek, and Milton Friedman. 
My ambition is to provide a fundamental formulation of the political landscape. 
The political landscape blooms with flowers and timber of every color, but I suggest 
three primary colors:  
•  leftism 
•  conservatism 
•  liberalism 
Leftism necessarily and conservatism typically resort to statism in the search for 
meaning. Liberalism is the ideology of depoliticization; it is an attitude and reform   2 
agenda that opposes the resort to statism in the search for meaning. It demands that 
people find meaning elsewhere, or, if they have to, settle for less meaning. 
The three primary colors find their differences in the configuration of ownership. 
The three ideologies work from three different configurations of ultimate ownership. 
The configuration issue relates closely to Adam Smith’s distinction between 
grammar-like rules and aesthetic rules for achieving beauty. Leftism is oriented toward 
the pursuit of beauty, or what Lon Fuller called the morality of aspiration. Leftism is 
inherently statist. Conservatism is oriented toward a social grammar, or what Lon Fuller 
called the morality of duty. Liberalism shares with conservatism a grammatical 
orientation—both “right” ideologies are social-grammar philosophies. But liberalism and 
conservatism differ in the configuration of ownership. Liberalism is a social grammar 
that militates against statism. Whether conservatism is statist depends on the ownership 
claims attributed to its spirit-lords, such as God and country. Mild claims for the spirit-
lords allow conservatism to eschew statism and merge with liberalism. 
Please avoid the precept that some kind of supreme right or ethical trump is 
thought to inhere in “liberty,” “ownership,” or “commutative justice.” Adam Smith wrote 
that prohibiting banks from issuing small-denomination notes was “a manifest violation 
of … natural liberty,” and yet favored it (WN, 324). Elsewhere he allowed a “superior” to 
transgress the rules of commutative justice (TMS, 81). The struggles and admixtures of 
the three primary ideologies certainly concern policy positions, but those differences are 
not our focus here. Rather, the focus is their semantics and conceptual formulations. One 
could uphold left semantics and liberal positions: “the minimum wage does not reduce 
liberty and is bad.” Likewise, one could uphold liberal semantics and left positions: “the   3 
minimum wage reduces liberty and is good.” Neither of these combinations would be 
illogical, merely peculiar. 
I favor liberal views and the eschewal of seeking meaning in statism. But those 
views are not argued here. Nothing I say here is intended as criticism of conservatism or 
leftism. 
 
Adam Smith: Two Types of Rules, Two Types of Justice 
 
When Smith addressed commutative justice, he called it justice, simpliciter. When 
he addressed distributive justice he generally used beneficence, benevolence, charity, 
friendship, and generosity.  
To illuminate the difference between commutative justice and other virtues, Smith 
drew an artful analogy to two different kinds of rules for writing: 
 
The rules of justice may be compared to the rules of grammar; the rules of the 
other virtues, to the rules which critics lay down for the attainment of what is 
sublime and elegant in composition. The one, are precise, accurate, and 
indispensable. The other, are loose, vague, and indeterminate, and present us 
rather with a general idea of the perfection we ought to aim at, than afford us any 
certain and infallible directions for acquiring it. A man may learn to write 
grammatically by rule, with the most absolute infallibility; and so, perhaps, he 
may be taught to act justly. But there are no rules whose observance will infallibly 
lead us to the attainment of elegance or sublimity in writing; though there are 
some which may help us, in some measure, to correct and ascertain the vague 
ideas which we might otherwise have entertained of those perfections. And there 
are no rules by the knowledge of which we can infallibly be taught to act upon all 
occasions with prudence, with just magnanimity, or proper beneficence: though 
there are some which may enable us to correct and ascertain, in several respects, 
the imperfect ideas which we might otherwise have entertained of those virtues. 
(TMS, 175-76) 
 
Later, Smith reiterates the analogy to writing: 
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It was observed … that the rules of justice are the only rules of morality which are 
precise and accurate; that those of all the other virtues are loose, vague, and 
indeterminate; that the first may be compared to the rules of grammar; the others 
to those which critics lay down for the attainment of what is sublime and elegant 
in composition… (TMS, 327) 
 
Smith says commutative justice is like grammar. He sees distributive justice as analogous 
to rules which critics lay down for the attainment of what is sublime and elegant in 
composition. As such, Smith’s analogy may be represented in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: How the Two Justices Parallel Rules for Writing 
 
  Nature of the rules 
  “precise, accurate, and 
indispensable” 









Writing  Grammar 
“rules which critics lay 
down for the attainment of 




Substantively, commutative justice is claims of ownership, including self-
ownership, and voluntary agreements:   
 
The most sacred laws of justice, therefore, those whose violation seems to call 
loudest for vengeance and punishment, are the laws which guard the life and 
person of our neighbour; the next are those which guard his property and 
possessions; and last of all come those which guard what are called his personal 
rights, or what is due to him from the promises of others. (TMS, 84) 
 
This formulation echoes Hume’s (1751, 26; 1740, 526). It holds up well throughout 
Smith’s work, and it constitutes “natural liberty.”
1 Smith says commutative justice 
“consists in abstaining from what is another’s” (TMS 269). 
                                                 
1 Elsewhere Smith also suggests that reputation, too, is protected by commutative justice (TMS, 82, 269; 
LJ, 8, 105, 121, 125, 399, 480).    5 
Smith explained that “Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative 
virtue”: 
 
The man who barely abstains from violating either the person, or the estate, or the 
reputation of his neighbours, has surely very little positive merit. He fulfils, 
however, all the rules of what is peculiarly called justice, and does every thing 
which his equals can with propriety force him to do, or which they can punish him 
for not doing. We may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing 
nothing. (TMS, 82) 
 
Commutative justice is parallel to grammar, for grammar, too, is exclusively negative, in 
the sense that appraisal of one’s grammar is little more than pointing out any grammatical 
mistakes. Complying with the rules of grammar, like complying with commutative 
justice, has little positive merit. Finally, grammar too can be fulfilled by “sitting still and 
doing nothing”—if a student turns in an assignment consisting of a blank sheet of paper, 
the teacher must concede that his grammar was flawless.  
Hayek (1976, 36) noted: “That practically all rules of just conduct are negative in 
the sense that they normally impose no positive duties on any one, unless he has incurred 
such duties by his own actions, is a feature that has again and again, as though it were a 
new discovery, been pointed out,” and he provides a lengthy footnote containing many 
examples of writers hitting upon the “negative” or grammar logic of liberty.  
Merely satisfying the grammar of commutative justice not only deserves little merit, 
but may well be blameworthy, just as blank sheet of paper fails aesthetically as 
composition. Distributive justice, Smith says, “consists in proper beneficence, in the 
becoming use of what is our own” (TMS, 269-70). Thus, Smith describes conformance to 
distributive justice as “becoming”—an aesthetic compliment—and identifies it with   6 
“proper beneficence,” which is one among “the other virtues” that, Smith said (175, 327), 
had rules that are only loose, vague, and indeterminate.  
 
The Two Justices Clarified by Ownership 
 
Both justices can be clarified by taking seriously the element of ownership that 
resides in each. Commutative justice “consists in abstaining from what is another's.” 
Thus, it is not messing with other people’s stuff.  
Ownership clarifies distributive justice, too, for Smith describes it as consisting 
“in the becoming use of what is our own.” I propose that again we think in terms of 
ownership, this time ownership of exhaustible resources. The resources include not only 
our tangible stuff, our person, and the contracted rights, but also our human capital, 
including our attention and energy. Distributive justice consists in our properly 
distributing our exhaustible resources. 
 
The Configuration of Ownership: 
Social Justice versus Libertarian Distributive Justice  
 
I submit that at the heart of social justice is a particular view of the configuration 
of ownership. The configuration presupposed by social-justice leftists and social 
democrats generally is that all resources in society are ultimately owned by society, the 
state, the people, the polity. That presupposition is something of a taboo; it is often only 
implicit or inchoate. But sometimes it becomes explicit.  
Good examples of works that make it explicit are The Myth of Ownership by 
Niam Murphy and Thomas Nagel (2002), and The Cost of Rights by Stephen Holmes and   7 
Cass Sunstein (1999). Holmes and Sunstein suggest that the polity is an encompassing 
social organization whose rules we all enter into “voluntarily” (210). They write: “Unless 
society is organized as a cooperative venture, private property cannot be created and 
maintained” (192). This language echoes John Rawls: “society is a cooperative venture 
for mutual advantage” (Rawls 1971, 4). With his construction, Rawls imagines people 
who “choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights and 
duties and to determine the division of social benefits” (11). Holmes and Sunstein affirm 
the “deep truth” in the medieval legal notion that “only the sovereign [has] an absolute 
interest in land: ordinary landowners ‘hold of the sovereign’” (63).  In their social 
democratic worldview, all things are owned, fundamentally and ultimately, by the polity, 
and any decentralized exercise of property rights or contract is undertaken by its 
authorized delegation. “Private property [is] a creation of state action,” “laws [enable 
property holders] to acquire and hold what is ‘theirs’” (66, 230). One of their chapter 
titles sums it up: “All Rights Are Positive” (35; cf 48, 83, 116, 184, 205). 
The tenant of an apartment building understands that “his” apartment is, 
ultimately, the property of the landlord. The employee of a company understands that 
“his” office, “his” desk, “his” computer are, ultimately, the property of the company. The 
social democrats view us as tenants of the polity. That car you drive is “yours” only in 
that the government delegates certain powers to you. Your property is the bundle of 
positive, prescriptive rights or sub-dominions that the government delegates to you to 
make use of the tangible stuff that ultimately really belong to the polity.  
The social-democratic works just noted are peculiar only in their candor. The 
political culture generally, or at least in academe and law, is essentially social-democratic   8 
in its tacit notions of the configuration of ownership. Legal positivism predominates in 
law schools. Law professors will tell you as a matter of conventional wisdom that 
ownership is the bundle of powers (or rights) that government accords the owner. These 
powers may be seen as sub-dominions which the government carves out and delegates to 
you. 
To the social democrat, in passing a minimum-wage law, society does not restrict 
your liberty. Rather, it refrains from granting you the right of employing someone for less 
than the specified amount. It has simply refashioned the bundle of rights you hold, just as 
a company may set rules for interactions among employees. If you don’t like the 
arrangement, you are free to exit the polity. There is no force, because no one has forced 
you to belong to the polity. The people, the state, is an encompassing overlord, and 
governmental bodies are the people’s administrative apparatus and official means of 
expression. 
Social justice would correspond to distributive justice only if, in understanding 
the phrase “the becoming use of what is our own” we read “our” in a collectivist way. 
Only if the set of social resources is understood as owned by the collective unit would 
distributive justice become social justice. In the collective sense, We own social 
resources, and We pursue distributive justice by the becoming use of what is Our own. 
That way of thinking about the matter is the essence of social justice. 
 
The Spirit-Lords of Conservatism 
I propose that conservatism be seen as including certain spirit-lords among the 
owners. These spirit-lords might be thought of as such things as God or the national 
spirit.    9 
In The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot, Russell Kirk presents six canons 
of conservative thought. The first canon begins: “Belief that a divine intent rules society 
as well as conscience, forging an eternal chain of right and duty which links great and 
obscure, living and dead. Political problems, at bottom, are religious and moral 
problems” (1960, 7). He writes that “the essence of social conservatism is preservation of 
the ancient moral traditions of humanity” (6). 
Kirk calls Edmund Burke “the greatest of modern conservative thinkers” (1). The 
following Kirk passages refer to Burke. They postulate an enduring divine spirit that 
suffuses society: 
 
[Burke] began and ended his campaign for the conservation of society upon the 
grand design of piety: in his reverent eyes, the whole of earthly reality was an 
expression of moral principle … In examining Burke’s conservative system, 
therefore, it is well to commence on the lofty plane of religious belief. (Kirk 1960, 
30) 
 
Revelation, reason, and an assurance beyond the senses tell us that the Author of 
our being exists, and that He is omniscient; and man and the state are creations of 
God’s beneficence. This Christian orthodoxy is the kernel of Burke’s philosophy. 
(31) 
 
[Kirk quotes Burke:] ‘the awful Author of our being is the author of our place in 
the order of existence; and that having disposed and marshaled us by a divine 
tactic, not according to our will, but according to His, He has, in and by that 
disposition, virtually subjected us to act the part which belongs to the part 
assigned to us.’ (33) 
 
‘There is an order that keeps things fast in their place,’ said Burke himself, 
penetrating to the very root of conservative instinct; ‘it is made to us, and we are 
made to it’… (34) 
 
[H]e says that mundane order is derived from, and remains a part of, divine order. 
Religion is not merely a convenient myth to keep popular appetites within bounds 
… (34-35) 
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In my scheme, it is a divine being that endures the ages. Its “own” might best be 
understood in terms of inherent obligations each person owes to it, as though the 
obligation were assumed by way of contract. Kirk writes:  
 
This social compact is very real to Burke—not an historical compact, not a mere 
stock-company agreement, not even simply a juridical concept, but rather a 
contract that is re-affirmed in every generation, in every year and day, by every 
man who puts his trust in another. (59)
2 
 
If we have a contract with the spirit-lord, and that contract says we are not to snort 
cocaine, then our snorting of cocaine violates commutative justice, for it violates the 
contract. When the government prohibits the snorting of cocaine, it is enforcing that 
contract, not violating our liberty—just as laws against fraud are not a violation of our 
liberty. 
Thus, as a matter of divine grammar, we are to obey the contract with the spirit-
lord:  
Burke … is emphatic that the first rule of society is obedience—obedience to God 
and the dispensations of Providence, which work through natural processes. (76) 
 
Another foundation for social principle is Burke’s ‘Obey the Divine design’—so 
one may paraphrase his concept of obedience to a natural order. By a proper 
regard for prescription and prejudice, we discover the means of dutiful obedience. 
(64). 
 
“Prescription” is the term that Kirkians use for what liberals would call paternalistic 
interventions.  
In the conservative grammar, although the individual must not transgress the 
spirit-lord’s dominion, the notion of the individual’s own is otherwise the same as in the 
                                                 
2 Kirk makes clear that he (and Burke) feel that there can be no meaningful or significant sense of 
contract—neither in the liberal sense nor the left senses—without a kind of moral underwriting by the 
divine spirit (54, 119). A contract between two individuals only has moral significance because it carries 
with it corresponding contracts with the divine spirit.   11 
liberal grammar. This liberal element of the conservative configuration of ownership is 
expressed in Kirk’s fourth canon of conservative thought: “Persuasion that property and 
freedom are inseparably connected … Separate property from private possession, and 
liberty is erased” (1960, 7-8). Thus both conservatives and liberals recoil at the left’s 
configuration involving “the people” as overlord. 
 
The Three Configurations of Ownership 
 
In Table 2 I represent the citizens of the polity as Lisa, Bob, …   
Governments—city, state, county, national—are owners of properties such as 
streets, parks, buildings, etc. These are represented as government1, government2, …  
I represent the spirit-lords as God and Patria. 
 
Table 2: Configuration of Ownership of Liberalism, Leftism, and Conservatism 
 
   
The Configuration of Ownership 




{Lisa’s own, Bob’s own, government1’s own,  






{the people’s own} = 






{God’s own, Patria’s own, Lisa’s own, Bob’s own, 
government1’s own, government2’s own, …} 
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The meaning of these configurations is illustrated by applying them to some 
concrete examples in Table 3: 
 
Table 3: Configurations of Ownership Applied to Concrete Examples 
   
Federal minimum wage 
law  Federal ban on cocaine 
Liberalism 
 
The law reduces liberty, 
as it violates the liberty 
of non-violators 
(employers). It aggresses 
on Lisa’s own, … 
 
The law reduces liberty, 
as it violates the liberty 
of non-violators. It 





The law does not reduce 
liberty, as it does not 
violate anyone’s own.  
 
The law does not reduce 
liberty, as it does not 




The law reduces liberty, 
as it violates the liberty 
of non-violators. (In the 
absence of a minimum 
wage, employing people 
at low wages does not 
violate God’s own or 
Patria’s own.) Thus, the 
law aggresses on Lisa’s 
own, … 
 
The law augments 
liberty, as it does not 
violate the liberty of non-
violators and it prevents 
violations of commutative 
justice. Even in the 
absence of such laws, 
engaging in cocaine use 
violates God’s own 
and/or Patria’s own.  
 
For the cocaine ban, Table 3 presupposes that the conservative view holds that 
cocaine use is a violation of God/Patria’s own. If, instead, we presuppose that the 
conservative view holds otherwise, then the cocaine ban is deemed a reduction in liberty. 
The example shows how the conservative configuration becomes isomorphic to the 
liberal configuration if the spirit-lords’ own are reduced to nothing. That kind of 
conservative-libertarian view is represented by Frank Meyer (1996), who upheld that 
policies like drug prohibition trenched on liberty, and he tended to oppose them. But   13 
other conservatives, such as Russell Kirk or Brent Bozell (see selections in Carey 1998), 
would tend to see cocaine use as a sort of violation of a spirit-lord, and hence would not 
see the ban as a reduction in liberty, just as a liberal does not see a ban on murder as a 
reduction in liberty. 
The variation among conservatives indicates precisely the problem of trying to 
achieve a grammar when certain owners, God and Patria, have ownership in properties 
and contracted claims that are intangible and ethereal. Lacking tangibility, the claims in 
question and the imputed exclusive dominions are terribly vague. By contrast, the 
ownership and contractual claims imputed to Lisa and Bob are based on tangibles and 
focal voluntary interactions (Friedman 1994). The liberal configuration consists of a set 
of reasonably clear and self-enforcing focal-points. Not so for the spirit-lords. The 
conservatives want to have a grammar, but they have a very hard time determining 
whether a word is a noun or a verb—or even whether a group of letters is a word. Did 
Bill Buckley violate his contract with God when he got stoned? Frank Meyer sought to 
avoid this problem by essentially taking the spirit-lords out of the configuration of 
ownership. But the statist conservatives cannot escape the problem, and their grammar 
suffers accordingly. 
Table 3 presupposes that the left would not regard the minimum wage and the 
cocaine ban as unconstitutional. Otherwise, they would be reductions in liberty. For the 
left, liberty does have meaning. It lies in the sub-dominions carved out of the polity’s 
super-dominion. The carvings made by the super level must be respected by lower levels. 
The constitution must be respected by Congress. Likewise, if local censorship laws 
transgress the dominions prescribed by the first amendment, they are deemed reductions   14 
in liberty. That’s why, for the left, the question of liberty consists of issues of civil 
liberties.  
The three configurations elucidate why liberalism is often tagged as “atomistic.” 
Indeed, the liberal configuration of ownership—and only the liberal configuration—is 
atomistic—or individualistic. That atomism is routinely used to tag liberal sensibilities as 
atomistic, but that maneuver usually lacks legitimacy. Liberal sensibilities see man’s 
inherent sociability—per Smith and Hayek—and see social processes as a skein of 
mutualities. Liberalism privileges neither the conservative spirit-lords nor the social 
democratic We, nor any other holisms, as a cultural force and source of meaning. But the 
warrant for the “atomistic” configuration of ownership is, arguably, as anti-atomistic as 
the respective warrants for the non-atomistic configurations. The warrants lie in the 
morality of aspiration, which cannot be atomistic. 
 
Juxtaposing Left and Conservative 
 
The left sees a circle encompassing the members of the polity at a point in time. 
As Tocqueville (1840, 693-94) observed, democracy allows citizens to feel that they are 
above the government and yet subservient to and a part of a larger entity. Universal 
franchise is vital to the notion of popular sovereignty. The people then own the resources 
of the polity, and politics becomes distributive justice—making a becoming use of what 
is our collective own. Leftism is fundamentally an aesthetic political pursuit, a morality 
of aspiration, working with loose, vague, and indeterminate rules, not a grammar. Acting 
together toward common ends and commonly experiencing the narrative make for an 
approximation of common knowledge (Chwe 2001), an imagined mutual coordination of   15 
sentiment, and an imagined community in the life moment. Part of the penchant is a 
yearning for sentiment to encompass all the people, at least in the imagination—what I 
have elsewhere termed “the people’s romance” (Klein 2005). Thus, the impetus to pursue 
collectively goal X is not so much the achieving of X as the collective doings supposedly 
done to achieve X. The penchant for encompassing sentiment by way of collective 
endeavor may well have origins in the evolutionary environment (Hayek 1978; 1988). 
The great endeavor and project of social democracy is the advancement of “equality,” 
“equal opportunity,” and “social justice.” The left is a politics of hope, of progress, of 
deliverance, of renewal. Its leaders are liberators—in the sense of liberating Us, the 
people, from traditional inhibitions and constraints, to exercise our collective will. Russel 
Kirk describes the tenets of radicalism at the end of the eighteenth century: “The aim of 
the reformer, moral and political, is emancipation—liberation from old creeds, old oaths, 
old establishments; the man of the future is to rejoice in pure liberty, unlimited 
democracy, self-governing, self-satisfying. Political power is the most efficacious 
instrument of reform …” (1960, 29-30). 
Where leftism finds meaning horizontally in the grand union during the life 
moment, conservatism finds meaning vertically in great and divine things descending 
through the ages, in the spirit-lords God and Patria. Edmund Burke is quoted by Kirk: 
“The reason first why we do admire those things which are greatest, and second those 
things which are ancientest, is because the one are the least distant from the infinite 
substance, the other from the infinite continuance, of God” (Burke quoted by Kirk 1960, 
40-41). The books Imagined Communities by Benedict Anderson and The Invention of 
Tradition edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983) offer incisive left-  16 
leaning analyses of how, around the world, imagined national communities arose partly 
from administrative relations with external powers, partly from technological 
developments promulgating a national language, and by the inculcation and propagation 
of symbols, rituals, and cultural artifacts of a supposed national tradition. These authors 
tell of an imagined ancestral spirit-lord that endures through time and serves as medium 
by which we are bound together. Leaders of conservative politics pretend to be 
personifications of the spirit-lord, symbols of its character, and protectors of its way of 
life. 
In Moral Politics, the social-democratic political psychologist George Lakoff says 
that meaning in politics organizes itself by metaphors of family-based moralities (2002, 
331). He sees conservative politics as based on a “strict father morality,” within which we 
can see the instructor and enforcer of the proper social grammar. He sees left politics (he 
calls it “liberal”) as the “nurturant parent morality,” which more emphasizes empathy, 
compassion, and fair distribution —virtues Adam Smith associated with distributive 
justice, or the becoming use of our own social resources. 
It is commonly pointed out that conservatism tends toward nationalism, while, at 
least by comparison, leftism tends towards internationalism. The connotations nicely fit 
the configurations offered here. Conservatism sees its national traditions as especially 
sacred. It is committed to them as ancient patrimony, and feels both obliged and justified 
in a nationalist prejudice. It instinctively presupposes a specialness or superiority in its 
Patria.  
Meanwhile, Kirk notes that “radicals unite in detesting Burke’s description of the 
state as a divinely ordained moral essence, a spiritual union of the dead, the living, and   17 
those yet unborn” (1960, 9). The left, by contrast, is a lateral association within the polity 
during the life moment. It is not superstitious and prejudicial about peculiar ancient 
traditions. It finds its meaning in the narrative and romance of this life’s experience. It 
understands that the yearning for the people’s romance is a general human yearning, not 
special to this particular people. Our people’s romance is our roller-coaster ride, basically 
no different than other people’s roller-coasters. The polity is a necessary device to delimit 
“the people” and define the requisite span of the experience and the sentiment, but it does 
not begrudge other peoples in other polities the same human yearnings. In fact, the chief 
downfall of the left’s internationalism is their defining collective project, the welfare 
state, as it makes it very difficult to be welcoming to immigrants. In discussing 
immigration from Mexico, Paul Krugman, for example, demonstrates fascinating 
contortions to hold on to both the people’s romance and a purported concern for poor 
people.
3 
Table 4 presents a scheme of statist penchants and includes distinctions between 
left and conservative. It mentions several of the ideas touched on here, as well as a few 
others I’ve been thinking about. 
                                                 
3 For a critical analysis of Krugman on immigration, see Klein with Barlett (2008, 121-23).   18 
Table 4: A Scheme of Statist Penchants 
Strata  Statist Penchants 
 
Governing-set mentality: high and looking up 
Self-exaltation, among the elites, close to the “alpha male” 
     Left 
•  Makers, transformers, 
liberators, deliverers 
     Conservative 
•  Personifications, 
symbols, protectors of 
way of life 
High-
strata 
Managerial mentality and Parental attitudes: high and looking 
down 
•  Pretense of knowledge 
•  Parentalism and bogus compassion 
 
“Nuturant” Parent                                Strict Father 
Caring toward development                Enforcing the conservative  

























Validation, government as phantom lord, submission, relinquishment 
of critical thinking at deep levels, sanctimony. 
 
Reverence of powerful/famous beings, kowtowing-obsequiousness-
fawning-servility. 
 
Envy, resentment   
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The Warrant and Limits of Grammar 
 
The grammar of natural liberty is, as such thing go, precise and accurate, to use 
Smith’s adjectives. The warrant for any political worldview, however, is not precise and 
accurate. The warrant is aesthetic—loose, vague, and indeterminate—a realm that Smith, 
in one spot, associated with Platonic justice (TMS, 270). That realm provides the warrant, 
also, for the exceptions one would make to adherence to the grammar. 
All three major ideologies affirm the liberal grammar in an important sense: They 
all insist that Smith’s commutative justice be upheld in private-to-private interaction. 
Aside from those who drive loud Harley-Davidsons and a few others, only the 
government gets to violate natural liberty. In that minimal respect we live in liberal 
polities.  
But as concerns government action, the dominant character of the “liberal 
democracies” is social democracy. All the actually existing parties are admixtures of the 
three ideologies, but since the so-called progressive era and the collapse of classical 
liberalism and its semantics, the times have increasingly become social democratic. The 
mythos of universal democracy—government is Us, the polity is Ours, and We are free in 
so far as we may exercise our democratic rights—has steadily advanced and 
fundamentally changed how people see politics and government. The social democratic 
ethos has undone the public understanding of Smith’s idea of liberty. It has disposed of 
liberty as a guiding political principle. The liberal lexicon was subverted during the 
progressive era and died in the 1930s. Now the cultural institutions, particularly academe 
and law, are solidly social democratic. The presumption is given to the status quo, not to 
natural liberty. Even “conservative” parties today, such as the Republican Party, are   20 
highly social democratic in character, appeal, and tactics. They are “conservative” only in 
a relative sense.  
It is probably natural for people to look for meaning in things that are powerful 
and permanent, so it is probably natural for people to look to government for meaning, 
for validation. But in addition to whatever is natural, the cultural institutions inculcate 
statist paths to meaning and validation. The public schools, academe, much of the major 
media, and the government itself tell Lisa and Bob, starting in grade school, that politics 
and government are a major source of whatever meaning they can find in their lives. 
Liberalism offers meaning to liberal intellectuals and ideologues, such as me. As a 
community, such liberals pursue the related causes of negotiating with statism and 
cultivating a liberal sub-culture, and, as an individual, each pursues his own aesthetic 
adventures within those causes. Liberalism, for us, is a great and relatively permanent 
cause worth belonging to and serving.  
For the masses, however, liberalism does not, itself, offer a basis for meaning. It 
does not make for mass political meaning. That is why it could not withstand the 
democratic tide that came in around 1890 and still engulfs us. That liberal principles 
cannot give wings to national spirit and the people’s romance was recognized by J. G. 
Fichte, an early rabble-rouser for German versions of those things.  In his Addresses to 
the German Nation in 1808 he said:  “What spirit has an undisputed right to summon and 
to order everyone concerned, whether he himself be willing or not, and to compel anyone 
who resists, to risk everything including his life?  Not the spirit of the peaceful citizen’s 
love for the constitution and the laws, but the devouring flame of higher patriotism,   21 
which embraces the nation as the vesture of the eternal” ([1808] 1968, 120, see also 125-
26). 
It is sometimes suggested that liberalism can provide mass political meaning by 
making the presumption of liberty itself a political ideal with which the people can 
identify. Thus, our American patriotism is a commitment and devotion to liberty; our 
American Patria is a liberal spirit. In my view, this view and hope never had much 
validity, and now has even less. It has never been proper to view liberalism as peculiarly 
American—Adam Smith never stepped foot in America. During the days when 
“liberalism” was still liberalism, America was an intellectual backwater. Any thought of 
liberalism serving as a basis for American pride and patriotism today is misguided. 
Liberalism ultimately invokes Adam Smith’s “universal benevolence,” wary of national 
prejudice. Liberalism is non-nationalist as well as anti-statist.  
Liberalism’s understandings, its configuration of ownership, its semantics, are 
today mortifying to practical politics. The major parties and the major media tacitly 
conspire to keep them out of the public mind. The conventional “liberal v. conservative” 
framework is a society-wide groupthink that protects taboos and shuts out the view that 
we live in a polity of wholesale coercions.  
Surely, there are in all people, and perhaps more so in Americans, certain bents 
toward natural liberty and suspicion and distrust of politics. But those bents cannot go far 
in making mass political meaning. Liberalism is bound to remain a rather intellectual 
affair, as its appeals are exceptionally intellectual. Justification for an ideology must 
come down to answering and satisfying the human yearning for meaning. Liberals must 
confess that their philosophy doesn’t deliver meaning by way of government and politics.   22 
However, they have strong, if subtle, grounds for claiming, with Adam Smith, that 
liberalism is a good platform for the spontaneous development and sustenance of diverse 
non-political sources of meaning. Finally, in pointing out the unintended consequences—
moral, cultural, and material—of the resort to statism for meaning, both left and 





Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. 1991. London: Verso. 
Carey, George W. 1998. Freedom and Virtue: The Conservative/Libertarian Debate. 
Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute. 
Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. 2001. Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common 
Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. [1808] 1968. Addresses to the German Nation. Ed. G.A. Kelly. 
New York: Harper Torchbook. 
Friedman, David D. 1994. A Positive Account of Property Rights. Social Philosophy and 
Policy 11(2) Summer: 1-16. Link 
Fuller, Lon. 1969.  The Morality of Law. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1976. The Mirage of Social Justice. Vol. 2 of Law, Legislation and 
Libert., Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hayek, Friedrich A.1978. The Atavism of Social Justice. In  New Studies in Philosophy, 
Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 57-68. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago.  
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1979. The Political Order of a Free People. Vol. 3 of Law, 
Legislation and Libert., Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1988. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger. 1983. The Invention of Tradition. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Holmes, Stephen, and Cass R. Sunstein. 1999. The Cost of Rights. New York: Norton. 
Hume, David. 1740. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1978. 
Hume, David. 1751. An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. New York: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1957. 
Kirk, Russell. 1960. The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot. Rev.ed., Chicago: 
Henry Regnery. 
Klein, Daniel B. 2005. The People’s Romance: Why People Love Government (As Much 
as They Do). Independent Review 10(1): 5-37. Link   23 
Klein, Daniel B., with Harika Barlett. 2008. Left Out: A Critique of Paul Krugman Based 
on a Comprehensive Account of His New York Times Columns, 1997 through 
2006. Econ Journal Watch 5(1): 109-33. Link 
Lakoff, George. 2002. Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Meyer, Frank S. 1996. In Defense of Freedom and Related Essays. Edited by W.C. 
Dennis. Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund. 
Murphy, Liam and Thomas Nagel. 2002. The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press/Liberty Fund Edition, edited by R.H. Campbell and A.S. 
Skinner. 
Smith, Adam. 1790. Theory of Moral Sentiments. Oxford: Clarendon Press/Liberty Fund 
Edition, edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de.  1969. Democracy in America. Edited by J. P. Mayer. Translated 
by G. Lawrence.  New York: Doubleday 
 